Background: A global budgeting system helps control the growth of healthcare spending by setting expenditure ceilings. However, the hospital global budget implemented in Taiwan in 2002 included a special provision: drug expenditures are reimbursed at face value, while other expenditures are subject to discounting. That gives hospitals, particularly those that are for-profit, an incentive to increase drug expenditures in treating patients.
Introduction
A global budget is 'an overall spending target or limit that constrains the price and the quality of the services provided'. 1 As such, it is a method to control aggregate spending on healthcare and therefore a method by which a society can choose how much to spend on healthcare and how healthcare spending will increase over time. 2, 3 Global budgeting systems are widely used in a number of countries, including England, France, Germany, Canada and Taiwan. In the USA, the Veterans Administration budget functions as a type of global budget. [4] [5] [6] [7] Ideally, a global budget system also encourages healthcare professionals to use their expertise to allocate medical resources. However, the incentives created by a global budget may cause providers, particularly for-profit ones, to alter the quantity or quality of care provided to patients in ways that maximize profit, thus undermining cost control and potentially affecting important healthcare decisions. In this paper we examine whether the effect of the global budget implemented by Taiwan on hospital drug expenditure varies among hospitals with different types of ownership.
In March 1995 Taiwan enacted National Health Insurance (NHI) to provide universal and comprehensive coverage. 8 At first, healthcare providers were reimbursed on a traditional fee-for-service (FFS) basis, but, in anticipation of rising costs, the NHI Act specifically called for the adoption of global budgeting. Taiwan has gradually imposed global budgets on each different healthcare sector covered by NHI (dental services, traditional outpatient Chinese medical services, Western-based medical clinics, and hospitals providing Western-based inpatient and outpatient medical care). Hospitals providing care based on Western medicine were shifted to a global budget on 1 July 2002.
The global budget that Taiwan adopted for these hospitals has two important features. First, the budget is a 'hard' cap 9 set at the regional level; that is, a fixed sum is allocated to each of six regions to cover inpatient and outpatient expenditures by all hospitals in that region. Unlike a global budget with a 'soft' cap, which can be exceeded if need be, the hard cap global budgets in Taiwan are fixed 'ex ante' (before the event) and are reconciled with the actual volume of services provided by adjusting the rate for each unit of medical service, known as the point value, 'ex post' (after the event). 10 That is, although technically providers continue to be reimbursed on a FFS basis, the fees are uncertain ex ante because the point value for a unit of service is discounted if necessary to ensure that total regional expenditures do not exceed the global budget. Hospitals within each region thus compete for shares of the budget by competing for patients, and each hospital has an individual incentive to increase services so as to win a greater share of the global budget, even though collectively this response causes the point value to decline. 6 The second important feature is that the hospitals are reimbursed differently for drug expenditures and for spending on other services. Expenditures on drugs are reimbursed from the global budget at their ex ante point value, before the ex post point value used to reimburse non-drug services is calculated. 10 That is, unlike reimbursements for non-drug services, reimbursements for drugs are not discounted to meet the global budget target. Drug expenditures therefore represent a risk-free and usually profitable flow of income for hospitals, giving them an incentive to treat patients with drugs rather that provide other types of care. 6 The Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) adopted several strategies to monitor drug use both before and after enacting the global budget, including developing drug use guidelines, auditing more claims, and instituting provider profiling (comparing costs and prescribing patterns among peer providers) and utilization review. 11 Despite these drug cost containment strategies, recent studies of this global budgeting system show that hospitals increased their use of drugs after its implementation. 6, [11] [12] [13] It remains unclear, however, whether the size of the response varies among hospitals with different owner types.
In Taiwan, public hospitals are managed by the government directly, or by public enterprises or public universities. Each year government funds are allocated to partially finance long-term investments and operating expenditures of these hospitals. In contrast, private for-profit (FP) hospitals are owned and operated by physicians who are the residual claimants, while not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals are owned by private universities, charitable groups or groups funding medical research and are subject to a non-distribution constraint.
14 NFP hospitals enjoy substantial tax advantages or exemptions from income, land and property taxes, which FP hospitals do not. Further, most NFP hospitals are financed by large charitable donations, while FP hospitals have to be financed by non-tax-exempt personal debt and their operating profit.
14 Studies in the USA suggest that FP hospitals have a stronger incentive to maximize cash flows than do NPF or public hospitals, 15 that profit incentives affect physicians' prescribing decisions 16 and that prescribing decisions in private hospitals, especially FP hospitals, are more responsive than public hospitals to changes in financial incentives. 17, 18 Similar behavior patterns have been documented for hospitals in Taiwan. 14,19 Consequently, we expect that FP hospitals may respond more aggressively than NFP or public hospitals to the incentives created by the global budget.
Further, the effect of ownership may vary among different types of hospital department according to their reliance on drugs to treat patients. In Taiwan, physicians are employed by the hospital, and so we may in general expect their decisions to be strongly influenced by hospital strategies adopted in response to the global budgeting system. However, physicians in departments where drugs already form a large part of regular treatment, such as those treating patients for hypertension, diabetes or schizophrenia, may find it easier to increase drug use, by using drugs more intensively or substituting them for non-drug treatments. 20 Conversely, physicians in departments relying more on non-drug treatments for their standard care, for instance surgical departments, may find that increasing the volume of non-drug services is a more attractive means of increasing their share of the global budget because monitoring of drug use by BNHI makes substantial increases in drug treatments problematic. 21 Therefore, we study in this paper the effect of the hospital global budget by examining expenditure on drugs prescribed for outpatients by departments within hospitals under different types of ownership, before and after the implementation of the global budget.
Methods
Conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates the average impact of the global budget, but will obscure any heterogeneity in the relationship between department type and drug use.
22,23 Therefore, we estimate the policy's effect using both OLS and quantile regression, because quantile regression estimates the marginal effect of an explanatory variable at a distinct point of the conditional distribution; this allows us to explore the heterogeneous responses of different hospital departments (Table 1) to the global budget with respect to their reliance on drug treatments. 22, 23 24, 25 in the quantile regressions. Our specification is:
where Y jt is the log of the average drug expenditure per outpatient claim in hospital department j in month t (in 1996 New Taiwan dollars, NT$); GB t is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all months after June 2002; FP h and NFP h are dummy variables identifying FP and NFP hospitals, respectively (with public hospitals serving as the reference group); Chronic hjt is the proportion of patients treated by a hospital department for a chronic (longterm) condition, i.e. one of the 95 chronic illnesses (e.g. hypertension, diabetes or schizophrenia) included on a list published by the Taiwan National Health Bureau. H ht is a vector of hospital characteristics variables; D hjt is a vector of hospital department characteristics; PV kt is the regional (ex post) point value; M t is a monthly trend term; and g j , d k and t t are fixed effects for the hospital department's type, its hospital reimbursement region and the year, respectively.
The coefficient of GB t measures the average response of a hospital department to the global budgeting system. Since hospitals of different ownership types may react differently, we include two interaction terms: GB t * FP h and GB t * NFP h ; their coefficients (b 2 and b 3 ) represent, relative to public hospitals, the additional response of FP and NFP hospitals. We also include the interaction term GB t *-Chronic hjt , because treatments for chronic illnesses consist largely of drug prescriptions and physicians in departments with a higher proportion of patients with a chronic condition are therefore more likely to respond to the incentive provided by the global budget. 12 (In our sample, the ratio of drug expenditures to total expenditures for patients with a chronic illness is on average 40 percentage points higher than the ratio for patients who do not have a chronic condition.)
The hospital characteristics vector H ht includes variables to control for accreditation level and bed size. Accreditation categories include: major teaching hospitals (the reference group), minor teaching hospitals, community hospitals and non-accredited community hospitals.
Major teaching hospitals may be more concerned to maintain or increase their perceived reputation for providing higher quality care than other hospitals. Consequently, they may prefer to prescribe more-expensive branded drugs, which are generally perceived as of higher quality than generic drugs. 19, 26 Hospital size is measured by the number of beds.
The hospital department characteristics vector D hjt includes patient characteristic variables: patient age, percent male, percent chronically ill, the proportion of cases diagnosed as diabetes, as hypertension, as arthritis, as heart disease or as psychiatric illness. To mitigate concerns about the possible effects of correlation between current and past drug expenditures, we included the log of average drug expenditures in the preceding month.
The variable PV kt reflects the discount applied to non-drug reimbursements. This variable equals 1 for all regions in the quarters preceding the imposition of the global budget. The variable M t is a monthly trend variable, included to control for common shocks across all departments at the monthly level.
Finally, the estimation includes several levels of fixed effects.
Sample and data
Our dependent variable is the average drug expenditure per outpatient visit by a hospital department in a given month. Drug expenditure is calculated from data in the NHI Database, which includes claims for healthcare use by all NHI enrollees in Taiwan each year (virtually the entire population). Each claim includes information on the patient's diagnoses, case-type (e.g. emergency or outpatient surgery), and dates of treatment, and on the hospital departments that provided the services. In addition, the outpatient claim includes detailed records of reimbursement, such as drug, diagnosis and examination, 15 and a hospital identifier that allows us to link hospital basic files to obtain a hospital's accreditation, ownership status and zip-code.
Our data are derived from the 2005 NHI 1 million sample, which is a random sample of 1 million NHI enrollees, roughly 5% of the Taiwan population, from the 2005 eligibility files. All outpatient claims for these 1 million enrollees between January 1997 and June 2006 were obtained. We restricted our attention to outpatient visits because drugs are the principal means for treating outpatients in hospitals, and because expenditures on inpatient care may vary widely if, for example, expensive equipment is used in treatment. Focusing on outpatients thus reduces heterogeneity in the cost of patient care that is unrelated to doctors' prescribing behavior.
We also excluded all claims for: 1. services provided by local clinics or in the form of Chinese medicine or for dental care; as noted above, these are covered by different global budgets than that covering Western-medicine hospitals; 2. dialysis and surgeries performed at outpatient visits because, as for drug expenditures, these services are reimbursed at face value; 3. treatments for patients that had zero co-payments (low-income patients), because behaviors of these patients are likely to differ significantly from those of the average patient.
Finally, the individual patient claims were condensed to the monthly hospital-department level. In total, we have 348 193 observations of the average drug expenditures on outpatients at a department in a hospital in a given month from January 1997 through June 2006. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable before and after the global budgeting system was adopted and for the independent variables described above. In Table 3 , we show how the control variables vary by hospital ownership. [27] [28] [29] Examination of the second row of Table 4 shows that the impact of the global budget in FP hospital departments relative to public hospital departments is positive and significant at all but the lowest percentiles, and that the magnitude rises across the percentiles. These results indicate that, relative to public hospitals, departments in FP hospitals were more likely to increase drug expenditures after the imposition of the global budget, with the positive response being larger as they relied more on drug treatments (i.e. as we move to the right of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable).
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Results
NFP hospital departments also increased their drug expenditures relative to public hospital departments, but there is less evidence of significant heterogeneity among departments in the response. Interestingly, these results also show a 'crossover'; at the two lowest quantiles, the relative impact of the global budget is actually greater in NFP than in FP hospital departments. This may be evidence that FP hospitals put greater emphasis on increasing non-drug treatments in departments where the resulting payoff might be larger; that is, where drugs are not much used in treatment. 13 In sum, these results indicate differences in strategies among hospitals with different types of owners, suggesting that FP hospitals responded more aggressively than NFP and especially public hospitals to the incentives created by the special treatment of drug reimbursements within the global budget, particularly in those departments most reliant on drug treatments.
Interestingly, the effect of the global budget on public hospital departments treating non-chronic patients (b 1 ) shows that these departments decreased drug expenditures, perhaps as part of a general attempt to cut costs.
Finally, the estimated coefficient for the owner-type variable FP shows that the general effect over the whole time period of FP ownership was to reduce departmental drug expenditures relative to those of public hospital departments, particularly at the higher We also conducted interquartile tests using Stata code^iqregt o check whether differences across the quantiles are significant. Table 5 displays the results of interquartile tests. We found that while there are no significant differences in the coefficients of variable of interest across quantiles below the median, the differences between quartiles above the median are statistically significant.
Sensitivity tests
We performed two sensitivity tests. First, we added seasonal dummies in addition to the monthly trend and the year fixed effects variables in case there were regularities in drug expenditures associated with seasonal conditions such as the weather. Inclusion of these variables did not affect our results. Second, we re-ran our specification excluding departments for which there were fewer than 30 observations (i.e. departments that we observed in the data set for fewer than 10 quarters) in case the behavior of newly entered departments or exiting departments biased our results. Again, we found that our main results were not affected by this exclusion although we did find that the exclusion of these short-lived departments reduced the size and significance of the response to the global budget by departments in NFP hospitals. (Results with seasonal variables and with departments with fewer than 30 observations excluded are available on request.)
Discussion
We used quantile regression to study the impact of Taiwan's global budgeting system on the drug expenditures of hospital departments in hospitals with different types of owner. While we find, as in other studies, that the overall response of hospital departments to the global budget was to increase drug expenditures, we also find significant heterogeneity in departmental responses. Departments within FP hospitals show small or insignificant increases in drug expenditures by low quartile departments and increasing expenditures by high quartile departments; NFP hospital departments also show increases at all percentiles, but with much less variation in their response. Public hospital departments, by contrast, show large positive increases in the lowest percentile departments, with the effect disappearing by the 75 th percentile. Our results suggest that both owner type and department type influence the change in drug use that followed implementation of the global budgeting system.
A limitation of this study is that we are uncertain as to exactly how the changes in expenditure are affecting patient care and outcomes. For example, while we observe that FP hospitals increased drug expenditures in high percentile departments, we cannot be sure whether the drug expenditures are increasing because more drugs are being prescribed than in the past for the same condition, or because of an increase in the use of drugs instead of non-drug treatments. Further, we have not investigated the financial impact of the response of FP hospitals to the Table 4 . Impact of global budget and type of hospital ownership on average hospital drug expenditures, by hospital department, in Taiwan Table 2 and a monthly trend term. International Health global budgeting system. These questions are important and deserve additional study.
Conclusion
Government-provided healthcare programs are likely to continue to experience financial pressure, and a global budgeting system may be an effective means of managing expenditures. However, the details of such a system must be carefully designed to avoid giving healthcare providers incentives to behave in ways that undermine cost containment goals or the quality of patient care. Our findings suggest that all healthcare providers altered medical treatments in response to imposition of the global budget. However, given that use of drugs was likely also influenced by the previous reimbursement system, it is impossible to say which change may have improved health care or made it worse. More research is needed to determine whether these very different responses had significant impacts on the quality of health outcomes for the patients affected.
